DEVELOPMENT
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND PROTECTIVE POLICY IN FIJI

There are serious contradictions between affirmative action and protectionist ideals on one hand and indigenous culture on the other for indigenous Fijians. The anomaly between the two has a potential of unravelling the "experiment" on indigenous progress. This in turn can lead to both political and economic instability and fierce provincial competition for financial resources.

By SANJAY RAMESH

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IN FIJI protective and affirmative action policies have had a profound effect on indigenous Fijians, because they are inspired by paternalism and do not have any form of independent oversight. As a result benefits from such a policy have resulted in uneven and unequal economic development in Fiji. The growing inequality is major cause of tension within the indigenous Fijian community and if continued unchecked and uncorrected will have far reaching consequences for Fiji.

The structures of affirmative action and protection of indigenous Fijian land and resources were firmly planted by the colonial authorities and continued in their neo-colonial form by indigenous leaders after independence.

In post Second World War Fiji, there were two push effects: Free Indian migrants had replaced Europeans as small-scale traders and the Indo-Fijian population had for the first time exceeded their indigenous counterparts. The colonial government was also irritated by the cane strike in 1943 led by mostly non-indentured free migrant leaders with extensive links to thed anti-British Raj movement in India. Conscious of these developments, the Colonial Government instituted affirmative action for indigenous Fijians.

While those with chiefly status found it easy to become part of the colonial bureaucracy, there were others of non chiefly status who started to emerge in the 1950s due to affirmative action. This group of indigenous Fijians - a mix of chiefs and non-chiefs - highlighted the fact that there was a serious imbalance with respect to indigenous participation in the economy. However, the group was sympathetic to the colonial policy of grooming up chiefs to take over mantle of leadership from the Europeans. Indigenous economic progress as a result took a back seat as affirmative action was incorporated into the Alliance Party manifesto in 1966.

The protectionist policy towards indigenous Fijians continued after independence in 1970 in the form of series of affirmative action programmes in education, investment, commerce and agriculture. The only beneficiaries of the programmes were a small group of mainly indigenous Fijian chiefs. As a result, the chiefs were largely happy with the status quo until there was policy rethink forced by the late Sakeasi Butadroka, who attacked the chiefs in the Alliance Party as well as Indo-Fijians. What Butadroka did in 1975 paved the way for rampant Fijian provincialism. Not long afterwards, chiefs from Western Viti Levu formed the Western United Front (WUF) as political battlelines were drawn between Fiji east and west in the 1982 general elections.

Rabuka in 1987 shook the political system further with his two coups. In doing so, he expanded the affirmative action base of the Alliance Party. For the first time, it was revealed that indigenous Fijians were in an economic ice age. There were huge gaps in indigenous participation in professions such as accountancy, law, banking, finance, and agriculture. Rabuka’s policy was to remove Indo-Fijians from positions of power and influence and to create the "space" for more indigenous Fijian participation.

The nationalist Taukei Movement and extremist factions within the Methodist Church played a major role in cementing a new reformed protective policy towards indigenous Fijians. The new policy was a more intrusive affirmative action in the form of quotas on taxi licences, access to loans, greater availability of scholarships, agricultural initiatives, and targeted investment programmes for Fijian provinces in shares and real estate. However, Rabuka’s reform of the neo-colonial protective structure was not based on any sound constitutional basis as provincial dogfight ensued over financial resources with Rabuka rushing towards then opposition leader Jai Ram Reddy for a new constitutional deal as a way out of Fiji’s economic and political malaise in 1995.

After a year of intense debate on constitution, the Constitution Review Committee (CRC) produced a report, which recommended a new electoral system, a majority common roll ballot, and a retention of affirmative action programs to ensure "economic" justice for indigenous Fijians. For the first time in post independence Fiji, power was to be shared among political parties. However, there was apparent lack of detail on how a multi-party executive in an ethnically divided society like Fiji would work.

In 1999, the Peoples’ Coalition Government came to power after indigenous Fijians abandoned Rabuka’s SVT. In continuation of the policies of the previous SVT Government, the Peoples’ Coalition policy makers developed their own protective indigenous policy, which premised upon indigenous land use and the review of ALTA.

In May 2000, coup leader George Speight came up with his own version of protective indigenous policy. The objective of the George Speight group was to protect indigenous Fijians through an indigenous civilian government, which would take full control over administration of indigenous land. Indigenous Fijians were to be protected from the sad legacy of colonialism as well as from Indo-Fijian encroachment. This theme of protection of indigenous Fijians through a series of affirmative action programmes was taken up by the Interim Government, which initiated the "Blueprint on Supremacy" - the next "evolutionary" phase of affirmative action programmes in Fiji.

Following the 2001 general elections, the ruling indigenous government enacted the Social Justice Act aimed at providing targeted programmes for indigenous Fijians in micro financing, education, export subsidy, taxi licensing, tax and tender. The aim of the affirmative action is to stimulate indigenous participation in the economy as well as maintain indigenous village social structure.

The aim of affirmative action strategy is to move more indigenous Fijians into the small group of indigenous Fijians who acquired property and wealth as a result of positive discrimination in the past. However, there are contradictions and problems with affirmative action. First problem is that the policy is paternalistic. It presupposes that economic development can take place by state led activities while reinforcing traditional practices and customs at the grassroot level (protective policy). The two policies of affirmative action and protection is synonymous and have become a major policy goal of the current indigenous Fijian coalition government.

The policy makers in Fiji expect a gradual improvement in the economic status of indigenous Fijians. However, there are contradictions that are largely ignored. Some indigenous businesses have questioned the paternalistic policy arguing that the policy has placed Fijian businesses at greater risk from both external and domestic market forces. There are emerging issues in education, especially in rural Fiji where there still remains a high drop out rate among indigenous Fijians from secondary schools. Fijian Affairs Board (FAB) scholarships to indigenous Fijians have been questioned as disproportionately high number of indigenous students fail to attend classes. Then there are even bigger problems of indigenous Fijians being used to secure government tenders.

Micro financing strategy as well as rural education initiative has not arrested urban migration of young indigenous Fijians. Many indigenous schools are barely standing and some are unfit to inhabit, even in some urban centres. Mixed report from the social justice front has led the Government of Fiji more towards protective policies and legislation. The Government finalised an indigenous land claims tribunal, modelled along the New Zealand experience. Next the marine resources and Fiji’s foreshore became part of native land with landowning units having exclusive jurisdiction. The indigenous government has also set in motion policies to groom the next generation of chiefs, just as the colonial government had done when Fiji was a British colony.

On land, a spate of non renewal of leases following the events of 2000 has subsided as some land has reverted to bush while the debate on agricultural leases continue. Native Land Commission and the Fiji Courts have been busy resolving disputes to chiefly title, prompted by struggles over control of lease money. The Government shifts from developing protective policy to implementing affirmative action on an ongoing basis. However, the problem still remains that without a comprehensive needs analysis at the grassroot level most of the indigenous policy initiative is on a trial and error basis.

The Government of Fiji published the "Blueprint on Supremacy" without doing any needs analysis at the village level. The Government ought to have conducted a comprehensive study on what are the economic aspirations of the rural community and how the Government can assist achieving these goals. Instead the government continued with old experiments. Evidence from 35 years of affirmative action in Malaysia indicate that the policy has all but failed. Fiji looks at the Malaysian model quite too often for inspiration. However, increasing unease in Malaysia suggests that indigenous Fijian government must evaluate objectively the many programmes under Social Justice Act.

There are even greater issues with indigenous Fijians because there are serious contradictions between affirmative action and protectionist ideals on one hand and indigenous culture on the other. The anomaly between the two has a potential of unravelling the "experiment" on indigenous progress. This in turn can lead to both political and economic instability and fierce provincial competition for financial resources.

Sanjay Ramesh is an independent commentator on Fiji affairs
sanjay_ramesh@yahoo.com.au