Toward Freedom [U.S. political journal]: 48:7, January 2000
MEDIA: JAKARTA'S PRESS CONCEALED ARMY'S CRUCIAL ROLE IN TIMOR LOROSAE
A week after the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence and
hundreds of journalists and observers fled, one thing was obvious. The
violence engulfing this half-island wasn't just the work of a ragtag group
of pro-Indonesian militia, but rather reflected a highly organised campaign.
Although obvious to Western reporters, that fact nevertheless escaped the
notice of most of Indonesia's press.
Indonesian view of Australian media coverage
By MARIANNE KEARNEY
HIDING WAR IN PLAIN SIGHT
Indonesia's coverage of East Timor violence concealed the army's crucial
role.
A WEEK after the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence and
hundreds of journalists and observers fled, one thing was obvious. The
violence engulfing this half-island wasn't just the work of a ragtag group
of
pro-Indonesian militia, but rather reflected a highly organized campaign.
Although obvious to Western reporters, that fact nevertheless escaped the
notice of most of Indonesia's press.
On the surface, the story centered on two warring political groups. But this
was mainly a convenient fiction, designed to perpetuate the idea that
factions had been warring in East Timor since 1975. Conclusion: without the
Indonesian army, the place would descend into civil war.
Unfortunately, Indonesia's press largely reported events from this
perspective, despite the fact that pro-integration militias overwhelmingly
committed the violence against unarmed civilians - in short, any accused or
known independence supporters. Once the pro-independence guerrilla army
Falantil signed a peace agreement in July, it wasn't involved in these
clashes. Evidence of the Indonesian military's involvement was easy to find
during the week of the vote. Yet, the Indonesian press largely presented the
violence as a conflict between two factions.
When the Indonesian police announced, two days before the vote, that it
would
stop the attacks and arrest anyone carrying weapons, the mainstream press
dutifully covered this. But the fact that armed, pro-Jakarta militias were
still rampaging around Dili the next day - without being stopped - wasn't.
Nor did the press dwell on the fact that the police didn't stop attacks on
unarmed people, or disarm and arrest any of those responsible.
For the Western press, presenting both sides of the story became almost
impossible. As Karen Polglaze, correspondent for Australia's AAP wire
service, explained, "When it becomes obvious that one side is patently
lying,
do you put it in the story because you're obliged to provide balance?"
In the week following the vote, the militia stepped up attacks on
pro-independence supporters and foreigners, making travel dangerous for both
journalists and their Timorese drivers and translators. Terrorizing Timorese
who helped foreigners became an effective way to limit the movement of
journalists, particularly in the western districts where militia violence
was
increasing.
Within a week, the campaign had achieved its aims. Only a handful of
journalists remained in Dili, basically confined to the UN Assisted Mission
in East Timor (UNAMET) compound.
Mary Robinson, the UN's High Commissioner for Human Rights, has concluded
that all evidence points to the army's involvement in "directing attacks
which moved from the western regions of Timor to Dili in order to move out
the international observers and then indulge in more violent killing."
The violence wasn't random, committed by rogue elements in the Indonesian
army, Robinson added, but "appears to have been systematic according to
reports by UN police, UNAMET staff, and local staff. Their evidence suggests
that TNI [the Indonesian army] was fully involved."
In the aftermath, most Indonesian papers mentioned nothing about such UN
conclusions - or the true extent of the devastation. If they covered it,
there was very little to suggest that that violence was largely
orchestrated,
and conducted, by Indonesian troops.
The media essentially believes the military can get away with anything,
explained Taufik Darusman, editor of the English language Indonesian
Observer. Darusman is one of the few Indonesian editors who thinks East
Timor
is still worth covering, since senior military officers may be called before
a war crimes tribunal. Most others aren't following this, he notes, because
"they don't understand the seriousness of the issue."
In fact, if the actual number of militia members was really as low as locals
say - perhaps a tenth of the 50,000 supporters that pro-integrationists
claim
to have - it becomes less likely that this was mainly the work of the
militias. Certainly, without military direction, they wouldn't have
destroyed
as much as they did. Evidence from eyewitnesses also suggests that soldiers
new to Timor - about 6000 men brought in just before the vote results were
announced - did much of the damage.
The Indonesian press did meticulously cover every perceived or potential
violation by UN troops who were sent to East Timor because the army hadn't
stopped the killing, burning, and looting. Newspapers and TV news were
filled
with images of "aggressive" UN troops pointing guns at East Timorese, along
with reports of human rights abuses toward Timorese civilians.
The Indonesian press had apparently forgotten that until two weeks into the
operation, UN troops didn't fire a single bullet or kill anyone in East
Timor, said August Parengkuan, editor of Kompass. Thus, most papers believed
the national news agency Antara's report that UN troops had burnt two
militia
members alive, even though no bodies were found. A senior journalist with
Pos
Kupang said Antara's story didn't hold up to cross checking, so they didn't
feel obliged to run it. Nevertheless, it was reported in most papers, as
well
on the state-run TV station. The result was a wave of anti-Australian
demonstrations, and threats to burn Australians.
The papers also trumpeted comments by pro-Jakarta militia spokesmen that
independence leaders Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Belo should be held
responsible
for the social chaos in West Timor resulting from an influx of thousands of
refugees. But they neglected to mention how many people were killed and what
towns were destroyed by pro-integrationists.
According to Parengkuan, although Indonesia's press is relatively free, many
papers still "don't dare report the real situation because they don't want
to
risk a reaction from the military."
The difference between how the Western and Indonesian journalists viewed the
same story is encapsulated by their different takes on the referendum
itself.
Pointing to a general ambivalence about East Timor, Darusman notes that most
Indonesians didn't expect such a large portion of the population to support
independence. "We took it for granted that the Timorese would think
Indonesian society was a better one than the Portuguese." Predictably, most
Western observers weren't at all surprised by the outcome of the vote.