The Independent (UK): 5 February 2000
EAST TIMOR: HOW JAKARTA'S GENERALS PLANNED THE CAMPAIGN OF TERROR
Documents obtained by The Independent in Dili, and analysed in Jakarta by Indonesian investigators and Western diplomatic sources, provide evidence of what has long been suspected, but never proved - that, for months before the referendum on East Timor's independence in August 1999, it was being systematically undermined by Indonesia's top generals.
By RICHARD LLOYD PARRY in Dili and Jakarta
INDONESIAN REPRESSION: Unearthed hoard of documents provides conclusive proof
of plan to prevent independence for breakaway nation.
By Richard Lloyd Parry in Dili
SENIOR Indonesian generals masterminded a campaign of repression and coercion
in East Timor in a desperate bid to prevent the territory from voting for
independence, according to secret military letters obtained by The
Independent.
The documents, recovered from military premises by human rights workers in
the East Timorese capital, Dili, provide the first conclusive evidence that
for months before the United Nations referendum on East Timor's independence
last August, it was being systematically undermined by the Indonesian
military.
The documents show that the army was supplying automatic weapons to militia
groups and pro-Jakarta puppets in the local government who used them to
murderous effect in the first half of last year. In violation of the
agreement signed by their government in the UN, officers in Dili asked for
naval ships to distribute free rice as a means of bribing voters to support
links with Indonesia.
Eventually, having accepted the likelihood of defeat, the military executed a
plan for an "evacuation" the forced deportation of 250,000 people to
Indonesian West Timor, after the vote for independence was announced in
September.
The documents implicate officers at every level of the military hierarchy and
will add to pressure for war crimes prosecutions. Indonesia's most powerful
general, Wiranto, continued to defy calls yesterday for his resignation by
the country's President, Abdurrahman Wahid, increasing fears of a split
between the army and civilian establishments.
ON THE day that the crucial find was made, early in October last year, it was
already much too late for East Timor. Its towns and cities, including the
capital, Dili, were in ruins. The local militias who had carried out most of
the dirty work had fled the country.
But the organisation that armed and supported them, the Indonesian armed
forces (TNI), was still present a few hundred soldiers, preparing for their
final withdrawal and burning their headquarters behind them.
It was in this sinister atmosphere that a small team of human-rights workers
sneaked into a one-storey building off Dili's main port road. Until a few
weeks before, it had been the offices of the adjutant general of the regional
commander and inside was a chaotic scene room after room stripped of
furniture and fittings, and littered with hundreds of thousands of papers,
the detritus of 24 years of Indonesian rule.
"There were kids playing on them, and shouting, 'The Indos have gone! The
Indos have gone!'," said one of the workers, from the East Timorese Hak
(Human Rights) Foundation. It was weeks before they realised the importance
of what they had found a treasury of information on the campaign of
genocide and deportation which followed East Timor's vote for independence.
The documents, obtained by The Independent in Dili, and analysed in Jakarta
by Indonesian investigators and Western diplomatic sources, provide evidence
of what has long been suspected, but never proved that, for months before
the referendum on East Timor's independence in August, it was being
systematically undermined by Indonesia's top generals.
They first tried to pervert it, by using military resources to buy off
Timorese voters. And they gave guns to the opponents of independence the
local militias, and the pro-Indonesia appointees in the local government.
But, from the start they were anticipating their defeat at the polls, and
hatching an alternative plan the forcible deportation of hundreds of
thousands of East Timorese, with the use of what a senior Indonesian general
referred to as "repressive/coercive" measures.
When the result of the referendum a 78.5 per cent vote for independence
was announced in early September, the plan went into effect. Within two
weeks, unknown numbers of Timorese had been killed, more than one-quarter of
them had been herded into Indonesia, and virtually every town had been laid
waste.
The documents implicate officers at every level, from the head of the Dili
traffic police, who worked out the minute details of the deportation plan, to
General Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo, the army chief of staff. "It's the missing
link," said one Western diplomat, after The Independent showed him the
documents. "It connects the military to the use of repression and coercion,
and it shows a clear chain of command from close to the very top."
The most important document dates from the very day that the referendum was
born. On 5 May 1999, the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal, the
territory's former colonial ruler, reached a formal agreement at the United
Nations in New York.
The planned referendum asked the East Timorese to accept or reject so-called
"special autonomy" proposed by Jakarta, which allowed for limited
self-government under continued Indonesian rule. The UN's responsibilities
would be strictly limited to the conduct of the poll all security would be
the responsibility of the Indonesian security forces.
Hours before the signing of the agreement in New York, the army in Jakarta
was already plotting its undoing. The Independent has obtained a telegram,
sent on 5 May by General Subagyo, and signed on his behalf by his deputy,
Major-General Johny Lumintang. The letter is addressed to Colonel Tono
Suratman, the military commander in Dili, and copied to senior military
figures. Its contents are damning.
The crucial order reads: "Prepare a security plan to prevent civil war that
includes preventive action (create conditions), policing measures,
repressive/coercive measures and a plan to move to the rear/evacuate if the
second option [independence] is chosen."
The striking part of the order is the preparation for "evacuation" and the
frank instruction to use repression. "That is very strong language," said one
Western diplomat. "Even in their most honest, secret discussions, generals
don't often own up to that kind of thinking."
The meaning of the phrase "preventive action (create conditions)" is
suggested by another cable found in the adjutant general's office, dated 6
July. It is a request from a Bali-based brigadier-general, Mahidin Simbolon,
for a naval vessel, the Jenis Frost, to be dispatched to East Timor and is
addressed to the TNI chief, General Wiranto. The cargo was not to be
munitions, but rice; its purpose political. "During the referendum process,"
General Simbolon said, "there are 35 NGOs [non-governmental organisations]...
who give food assistance to the people. This can affect the result of the
referendum which is why the local government has to provide food assistance
to the people as soon as possible."
The New York agreement banned any use of government resources to influence
the referendum. But rice was the most harmless of the TNI's contributions to
the anti-independence campaign. In the military headquarters in the town of
Vikeke, the researchers from the Hak Foundation found a log book detailing
the weapons distributed to the local Wanra militia and pro-Jakarta leaders.
The first page alone lists scores of guns given to the militia. "What
surprises me is the sheer quantity," said the Western diplomat. "We knew that
the militia were getting military weapons, but we never knew it was this
many."
The Indonesian attitude to the referendum, as a war to be won or lost, is
illustrated in a document dated July 1999, and drafted by an officer of the
Dili-based Wira Dharma command, Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjarwo. The 13 pages
outline "Operational Plan Wira Dharma '99", nothing less than a battle plan.
One section describes the "Enemy Forces" not only the guerrillas of the
resistance movement, Falintil, but civilians, including unarmed student
groups and political organisations.
By mid-summer, it was clear that hopes of winning the referendum were waning,
and the generals were doing everything in their power to buy and coerce the
population.
In August, the Dili police department produced a volume called Operation
Remember Lorosae II, after the local word for Timor. This includes a
meticulous plan to evacuate hundreds of thousands of Timorese after the
referendum. It contains charts breaking down the population into regions and
into two groups for and against Indonesian rule. In keeping with the TNI's
deluded assumptions, it estimates that supporters of autonomy outnumber those
for independence by 517,430 to 367,591. Starting with these numbers it
presents two plans, based on the outcome of the vote.
In each, it proposes an evacuation of 50 per cent of those who supported the
losing side. Within a month, the plan was put into precise action. The table
estimates the number of vehicles needed to transport the "evacuees" from each
region. In the case of a win for independence, the number earmarked for
"evacuation" is 258,710 people almost exactly the 250,000 estimated to have
been forcibly displaced after the vote.
EXCLUSIVE: LETTERS REVEAL HOW INDONESIAN GENERALS PLANNED REPRESSION