Asia-Pacific Network: 27 January 2000
MALUKU: WHILE ELEPHANTS FIGHT, THE PEOPLE OF MALUKU DIE
The chain of sectarian conflict in Maluku now spreading throughout Sulawesi, Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara and Java has been triggered and fed by a number of provocateurs paid by the Suharto family and several cronies, according to monitoring by a sociologist and two human rights organizations, KONTRAS and Komnas HAM.
By GEORGE ADITJONDRO
THE INDONESIAN military's tradition of manipulating social unrest, and
unilaterally attempting to deflate the emergent dynamics of civil society by
creating or supporting new organizations oriented towards the military, is
becoming increasingly relevant today.
Lately, in the wake of the forced evacuation of the Indonesian Armed Forces from Timor Lorosae (East Timor), a nation they had ravaged for nearly a
quarter of a century, and after the Indonesian Armed Forces' dual function
has been successfully dismantled, influencing the social legitimacy of the
Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri regime, old methods to spark
"horizontal conflict" have been revived.
For more than a year now, the people of the Maluku Islands, recently divided
into two to become the province of Maluku with the city of Ambon as its
capital, and the province of North Maluku with Ternate as its capital, have
been embroiled in a "civil war" between Muslims and Christians. Fatalities
have so far reached 2000, a high percentage of the population of 2 million.
News about the incidents have spread orally for a year, and now, information
that has long been disseminated through the Internet has finally made it to
the pages of the mass media: The chain of sectarian conflict in Maluku now
spreading throughout Sulawesi, Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara and Java has
been triggered and fed by a number of provocateurs paid by the Suharto family
and several cronies. That is the result of monitoring by the
Halmahera sociologist, Thamrin Amal Tomagola, a professor at the
University of Indonesia's Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, and two
human rights
organizations, KONTRAS and Komnas HAM. The indications became clearer after
Komnas HAM discovered fake documents in the streets of Ambon inciting the
population to religious war, following a string of bloody events in the area
(Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January 2000).
Three provocateurs from Maluku whose names have come up frequently are: Butje
Sarpara, Dicky Wattimena and Yorris Raweyai. Sarpara is a former teacher from North Maluku, who has also been head of the Agricultural Office in
Jayapura (now Port Numbay) in West Papua. Colonel Wattimena is a former
member of the Presidential Security Corps (PASWALPRES) and former Mayor of
Ambon. Yorris Raweyai is the deputy chair of the Pancasila Youth, close to
Bambang Trihatmodjo, the second son of former President Suharto (Jakarta
Post, 18 January 2000; Sydney Morning Herlad, 19 January 2000).
These provocateurs do not work alone. In particular, Yorris Raweyai, whose
formal residence is in Jakarta but, in collaboration with Yapto
Suryosumarno,
chair of the Pancasila Youth, is reported to be involved in provocationary
activities to incite ethnic conflict in other provinces, for example West
Kalimantan, where the Malay and Dayak ethnic groups who, last year were
comrades in arms against Madurese migrants are beginning to wage a bloody
conflict against each other (SiaR, 16 April l999).
In Ambon itself, the provocateurs need only to incite Christian and Muslim
gangs of young delinquents to spark conflict. These gangs in turn have
their respective "bosses" in Jakarta, who are attempting to gain the
support of
Suharto's children.
The gang of Christian delinquents is named Cowok Keristen (Christian Boys),
shortened to Coker, and uses the Maranatha Protestant church as
headquarters.
In Jakarta, they are connected to two Moluccan Christian youths, Milton
Matuanakota and Ongky Pieters. This gang of Moluccan Christian youths
dominate the shopping centre, parking area and gambling dens in West
Jakarta. After the Ketapang incidents in Jakarta, November l998, hundreds
of Milton and Ongky's followers moved to Ambon.
In Jakarta, antagonists of the Milton and Ongky group are represented by
Ongen Sangaji, a Pancasila Youth activist and coordinator of a Moluccan
Muslim university student organization. Many members of this group were
recruited into the PAM Swakarsa (civilian security troops) used by then
Chief of Armed Forces, General Wiranto, and Acting President Habibie to
cordon off the parliament building from university students protesting the
Extraordinary Session of the MPR in November l998. Meanwhile, Ongen is
reported to have close ties to Bambang Trihatmodjo, while Milton is said to
be closer to Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (van Klinken, n.d.; HRW l999:8).
The bloody conflict in Maluku does not involve only civilian leaders and the
former Ambon mayor. Active military and police are also suspected by
Tamagola to be involved in practices to incite conflict. He is of the
opinion that the network of provocators can be traced back to connections
with former Minister of Defense and Security, Armed Forces Commander
General Wiranto (Sydney Morning Herald, 19 January 2000).
Three members of the TNI/ Police were apprehended in a raid to impose the
curfew in Ambon, last Saturday evening, 15 January. The three individuals
were: one member of Kopassus (army special forces) and two members of the
police. "The three members of the security forces were apprehended because
they were on the streets after the curfew lasting from 22:00 East Indonesia
Time to 06:00 East Indonesia Time," said the Commander of Military region
XVI/ Pattimura, Brig. Gen. (TNI) Max Tamaela to Ambonese journalists (Jawa
Pos, 17 January 2000).
Unfortunately, it is not merely one or two "Armed Forces elements" who are
involved. According to one of my sources in Ambon, in early December l999,
after the President and Vice Presidentís visit to Ambon, the TNI Commander
sent 500 troops to the area. Upon arrival at their destination, they
rested in a number of barracks. However, only some 200 troops reached the
barracks, while 300 of those who were sent on the same ship disappeared
with their weapons.
Where did they go? It turns out that they have disappeared into the
civilian
population. Not long after, the "massacres" erupted in late December l999.
Indications that the massacres were triggered by the troops who disappeared
from the harbour include the discovery of precisely the same type of
weapons
as those owned by the 200 troops still on duty in the hands of civilians.
This incident has been reported to the Commander of the Armed Forces but is
still kept a secret.
From where do the provocators receive their "operational funds?" Apart from
the Suharto family, they are also funded by two Suharto cronies with
business interests in North Maluku, i.e. Eka Cipta Widjaja and Prajogo
Pangestu (Jakarta Post, 18 January 2000).
Indeed, the Eka Tjipta Widjaja family is the owner of the Sinar Mas group,
of
which PT Sinar Mas Agro Resources and Technology (SMART) is a member
company,
and chaired by General Yoga Sugama, a relative and business partner of the
Suharto family. A SMART subsidiary, PT Global Agronusa Indonesia has run a
banana plantation of some 2,000 hectares since December 1991 in Halmahera,
in a joint venture with the US fruit giant, Del Monte (IEFR, l997: 82-83;
Swa, 2-27 November l996: 86-87).
Prajogo Pangestu, meanwhile, is owner of the Barito Pacific group, in which
two Suharto children (Tutut and Bambang), a Suharto son-in-law (Indra
Rukmana) and two younger brothers of the late Mrs. Tien Suharto (Ibnu
Hartomo and Bernard Ibnu Hardoyo) have either shares or positions. This
group owns the largest number of forest license in Indonesia (52 areas) for
a total of more than 5 million hectares.
Prajogo Pangestu is also noteworthy as one of the largest contributors to
the
Suharto clique. An investigation by the Indonesian Attorney General
revealed
that in l990 Indoverbank NV in the Netherlands received US$ 225 million in
the name of three foundations chaired by Suharto -- Supersemar, Dharmais,
Dakab -- from Prayogo Pangestu, transferred from Prajogoís account at the
Singapore Branch of Citibank and BDN, Jakarta (Waspada, 22 May 1999, quoted
>from Antara). This Barito Pacific Group boss also gave a contribution of
Rp. 80 billion for the June l999 Golkar campaign, amlost more than a
quarter of the total cost (of Rp. 350 billion) of the campaign. In
addition, Prajogo also "contributed" to the All Indonesia Wrestling
Association (PGSI) through the personal account of the Attorney General at
that time, Andi Ghalib (Brown, l999: 16).
Prajogo Pangestuís "treasury" in Maluku is enormous, as the Barito Pacific
group controls PT Green Delta (HPH or forest concession covering 124,000
hectares, ending in December 2000); PT HBI Buntu Marannu (concession
covering
48,000 hectares, ending July 2007); PT Mangole Timber Producers (concessions
covering 191,800 hectares) and a plywood plant on the island of Mangole,
partly expiring October 2010, and the rest April 2013); PT Seram Cahaya
Timber (concession covering 58,000 hectares on Seram island, until January
2012); PT Taliabu Timber (concessions covering 100,000 hectares and plywood
factory in Mangole island, expiring July 2009); PT Trio Maluku Pacific Raya
(concessions covering 105,000 hectares until February 2001); PT Tunggal
Agathis Indah Wood Industry (concessions covering 125,000 hectares and
plywood factory on Jailolo island, until August 2012); PT Tunas Forestra
(concessions covering 42,300 hectares, until April 2012); PT Wana Adhi Guna
(concessions covering 64,000 hectares, until March 2009); glue factory PT
Wiranusa Trisatya on Taliabu island, and PT Yurina Wood Industry plywood
factory in Ternate (Brown, l999: 14-16, 40, 62; PDBI: 83-84, 114).
The Cendana cloque and the extreme right group of generals have yet another
source of funds with big business in Maluku in Tommy Winata, boss of the
Artha Graha group, reportedly very close to Yorris Raweyai (Tempo, 31 May-6
June 1999: 39-50). He is a shareholder in the PT Ting Sheen Bandasejahtera
fishing company investing US$200 million, projected to have a capacity of
catching 2.5 million tonnes of fish per year. This fishing armada is
harboured at Desa Ngadi, Tual, and is a joint venture with Bambang
Trihatmodjo and a Taiwanese company (Swa, 22 August-11 September 1996:
128-129).
There is a possibility that he too has contributed to the activities of
provocators in Southeastern Maluku, in view of the fact that religious
conflict in Maluku began 15-17 January 1999 in Dobo (the Aru Islands
regency), by 31 March 1999 had revisited Southeastern Maluku, in the city
of Tual (Lesser Kei islands) and by 6 April 1999 had spread to the Greater
Kei islands.
It is clear that the conflict in Maluku is in fact an effect of political
struggles in Jakarta. A number of generals who feel that their powers have
been curtailed with the appointment of the new Armed Forces Chief from the
Navy, are trying to show that the new Chief is incabale of controlling the
situation in Maluku. This group, who have the most at stake in maintaining
the Armed Forces dual function, are trying to demonstrate that the Armed
Forces -- specifically the Army -- are still needed as the peace-makers in
the midst of a civil society prone to conflict. This has been demonstrated
in Maluku, where thousands of troops are now deployed to "soothe" both
parties burning with revenge and the spirit of jihad.
In addition, Islamic groups, who feel they have not been given an
appropriate
share in the Wahid and Megawati government are also attempting to maintain a
warlike atmosphere in Maluku, in order to be able to mobilize their masses
to
"pressure" -- or, if possible, to bring down -- a president who is half
blind and a vice president who is unable to speak.
Finally, behind all this, the one who stands to gain the most from the
upheaval in Maluku is Suharto and his family and cronies, who thereby
increase the distance between them and efforts to bring them to court to
account for their political and economic crimes. They clearly benefit from
the disturbances of the peace that serve to perpetuate the Armed Forces'
dual function, especially as the Armed Forces, through scores of
foundations and pensioned officers is deeply enmeshed in the tentacles of
the Suharto family business (see Samego, 1998; Aditjondro, 1998: 32-36).
Bibliography:
Aditjondro, G.J. (1998). Dari Soeharto ke Habibie: Guru kencing berdiri,
murid kencing berlari: kedua puncak korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme rezim
Orde Baru. Jakarta: Pijar Indonesia & Masyarakat Indonesia untuk
Kemanusiaan.
Brown, David. W. (1999). Addicted to Rent: Corporate and Spatial
Distribution of Forest Resources in Indonesia -- Implications for Forest
Sustainability and Government Policy. Jakarta: Indonesia-UK Tropical Forest
Management Programme, Provincial Forest Management Programme.
HRW [Human Rights Watch] (1999). Indonesia: The violence in Ambon. New
York:
Human Rights Watch.
Van Klinken, Gerry (n.d.). What caused the Ambon violence? Perhaps not
religious hatred, but a corrupt civil service sparked the bloodletting.
Article on the Internet.
PDBI [Pusat Data Business Indonesia] (1994). Forestry Indonesia.Jakarta:
Pusat Data Business Indonesia.
Samego, Indria et al (1998). Bila ABRI berbisnis. Bandung; Mirzan.